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Spoken Dialogue Systems ask for clarifi-
cation when they think they have misun-
derstood users. Such requests may dif-
fer depending on the information the sys-
tem believes it needs to clarify. However,
when the error type or location is misiden-
tified, clarification requests appear confus-
ing or inappropriate. We describe a clas-
sifier that identifies inappropriate requests,
trained on features extracted from user re-
sponses in laboratory studies. This classi-
fier achieves 88.5% accuracy and .885 F-
measure in detecting such requests.
1 Introduction
When Spoken Dialogue Systems (SDS) believe
they have not understood a user, they generate re-
quests for clarification. For example, in the fol-
lowing exchange, the System believes it has mis-
understood the word Washington in the user’s ut-
terance and asks a clarification question, prompt-
ing the user to repeat the misrecognized word.
User: I’d like a ticket to Washington.
System: A ticket to where?
User: Washington.
Clarification requests may be generic or specific
to the type and location of the information the sys-
tem believes it has not recognized. Targeted clar-
ifications focus on a specific part of an utterance,
as in the system’s question above. They use under-
stood portions of an utterance (“I’d like a ticket
to”) to query a misunderstood portion (“Wash-
ington”). Targeted clarification is a type of task-
related request, which has been shown to be more
effective and prevalent in human-human dialogues
than more general clarification requests (Skantze,
2005). Such generic clarifications signal mis-
understanding without identifying the type or lo-
cation of the misunderstanding. They often take
the form of a request to repeat or rephrase, e.g.
“please repeat”, “please rephrase”, “what did
you say?”.
Questions that address a particular type of mis-
recognition come in several varieties. Systems
may ask reprise clarification questions, by repeat-
ing a recognized portion of an utterance (Ginzburg
and Cooper, 2004; Purver, 2004). Systems may
also request that users spell a word if they be-
lieve the misrecognized word is a proper name,
especially one that is not in its vocabulary (OOV).
They may ask the user to provide a synonym for
OOV terms that are not proper names. Systems
may also ask users to disambiguate homophones
(e.g. “Did you mean ‘right’ as in correct or ‘rite’ as
in a ritual?”). They may request confirmation ex-
plicitly (e.g. “I heard you say Washington. Is that
correct?”), or implicitly, by repeating the recog-
nized information while asking a follow-up query
(e.g. “When do you want to go to Washington?”).
Each request type may be appropriate in different
circumstances. However, when systems make in-
appropriate requests to users, such as to rephrase
a proper name or to confirm a statement that con-
tains a misrecognized word, dialogues often go
awry. Therefore, it is extremely important for sys-
tems to know when a request is inappropriate, so
that they can provide a different clarification re-
quest or fall back to a more generic strategy.
In this work, we develop a data-driven method
for detecting inappropriate clarification requests.
We have defined a list of inappropriate request
types and have collected a corpus of speaker re-
sponses to both appropriate and inappropriate re-
quests under laboratory conditions. We use this
corpus to train an inappropriate clarification clas-
sifier to be used by a system after a user responds
to a system request, in order to determine whether
the question was appropriate or not. In Section 2,
we describe previous research on error handling in
dialogue. We describe our data set in Section 3 and
our approach in Section 4. We present our evalua-
tion results in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6
and discuss future directions.
2 Related Work
Today’s SDS use generic approaches to clarifica-
tion, asking the user to repeat or rephrase an en-
tire utterance when the system believes it has not
been understood correctly. They use confidence
scores on the ASR hypothesis to decide whether
to accept, reject, or ask for clarification (Bohus
and Rudnicky, 2005). Hypotheses with low scores
may be confirmed and those with lower scores will
trigger a generic request for repetition or rephras-
ing. Researchers have found that the formulation
of system prompts has a significant effect on the
success of SDS interaction. Goldberg et al. (2003)
find that form of a clarification question affects
user frustration and the consequent success of clar-
ification subdialogue. In previous work, we ex-
plored the use of targeted reprise clarifications to
improve naturalness (Stoyanchev et al., 2014).
Lendvai et al. (2002) apply machine learning
methods to detect errors in human-machine di-
alogue, focusing on predicting when a user ut-
terance causes a misunderstanding. Litman et
al. (2006) identify user corrections of the system’s
recognition errors from speech prosody, ASR con-
fidence scores, and the dialogue history. In con-
trast, we focus here on detecting when a system
clarification request is the cause of dialogue prob-
lems. We employ only lexical features here, as
well as the type of system request, to investigate
user responses to a wide variety of system re-
quests, and to identify system errors in request for-
mulation from user reactions. In future work we
will include acoustic and prosodic features as well.
3 Data
Our data consists of spoken answers to clarifica-
tion requests collected at Columbia University us-
ing a simulated dialogue system in order to control
recognition results and type of system response.
The system displays a sentence and asks the user
to read it. The system then issues a pre-prepared
clarification request, which may be appropriate or
inappropriate, to which the user responds. For ex-
ample, in the following exchange, the system sim-
ulates a misunderstanding of the word furor by
asking a targeted reprise clarification question.
User: We hope this won’t create a furor.
System: Create a what?
User: A furor, an uproar.
The system issued six different types of clari-
fication requests: confirmation; rephrase, spell, or
disambiguate part of the utterance; targeted reprise
clarification; and a targeted-reprise-rephrase com-
bination. These request types were chosen based
on the types of requests made by the SRI Thunder-
BOLT speech-to-speech translation system (Ayan
and others, 2013). Confirmation questions sim-
ply ask the user to confirm an ASR hypothesis.
Rephrase-part requests ask users to rephrase a spe-
cific part of an utterance which is played back
to the user. Spell questions ask users to spell a
word or phrase using the NATO alphabet. Disam-
biguate questions clarify ambiguous terms. Tar-
geted reprise clarification questions make use of
the recognized portion of an utterance to query the
part that has been misrecognized based on the sys-
tem’s assessment. Targeted-reprise-rephrase re-
quests are similar, with the additional request for
the user to rephrase a portion of the utterance
believed to have been misrecognized, which is
played to the user.
Inappropriate requests in this study were de-
fined as those that resulted from the Thunder-
BOLT system’s incorrect identification of an er-
ror segment or an error type. For example, the
clarification request “Please say a different word
for Afdhal” is inappropriate since it asks for a
rephrasal of a proper name. A request to spell
a very long phrase is also identified as inappro-
priate since users have found this difficult, espe-
cially when using the NATO alphabet. Requests
to disambiguate in the system provide two possi-
ble senses of the ambiguous word and are inap-
propriate when the correct sense is not one of the
two provided. Targeted reprise clarification ques-
tions are inappropriate when the error segment is
not correctly recognized and an errorful segment
is included in the question (e.g. “The okay I zoo
would like what?”). An appropriate question cor-
rectly identifies the error segment or ambiguous
term and the error type. For example, the ques-
tion “I think ‘Afdhal’ is a name. Please spell it”,
would be appropriate when ‘Afdhal’ is OOV be-
cause it correctly targets the error and its type.
For each clarification request type, except for
confirmation questions, which are always appro-
priate, we created one or more types of inappro-
priate requests for each of the conditions we ob-
served in dialogues collected with the Thunder-
BOLT system. For example, when the system
asks the user to rephrase a part of their utter-
ance which the system believes to be a misrecog-
nized non-proper-name, the question is appropri-
ate when indeed that non-proper-name has been
misrecognized. However, the request will be in-
appropriate when the hypothesized error segment
played back to the user is a partial word, a proper
name, an extended segment including a name, or
a function word. We created instances of each
of these conditions for our users to respond to in
our experiment. A full list of the system question
types and their appropriate and inappropriate con-
ditions is provided in Table 3, in the Appendix.
We prepared 228 clarification requests (84 appro-
priate and 144 inappropriate), 12 for each of the 19
categories listed in Table 3 in the Appendix, based
on data in the TRANSTAC dataset (Akbacak and
others, 2009). Our subjects were 17 native Ameri-
can English speakers, each of whom answered 114
requests. We recorded speakers’ answers to 714
appropriate and 1224 inappropriate requests. As
most request types have more than one inappro-
priate version, 63% of the requests in the data set
are inappropriate.
4 Experiment
We used the Weka machine learning library (Wit-
ten and Eibe, 2005) to train classifiers to predict
whether a clarification request was appropriate or
inappropriate. Our features were extracted from
transcripts of user utterances, and included lexical,
syntactic, numeric, and features from the output of
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pen-
nebaker et al., 2007) as described in Table 1.
We included unigram and bigram features, ex-
cluding unigrams that appeared fewer than 3 times
in the dataset (11% of the unigrams), and bi-
grams that appeared fewer than 2 times (25%),
with thresholds set empirically. LIWC features
were extracted using the LIWC 2007 software,
which includes lexical categories, such as articles
and negations, and psychological constructs, such
as affect and cognition. In one version of the
corpus, we replaced sequences of user spellings
with the tag “SPELL” and disfluencies with the
symbol “DISF”. We used the Stanford POS tag-
ger (Toutanova and others, 2003) to tag both
the original corpus as well as the modified ver-










Bigrams of POS assigned by Stanford
tagger
liwc LIWC Output
func ratio Proportion of function words in re-
sponse
len spell Total length of spelling sequences in
response
request type Type of request preceding response
Table 1: Features used in Classification.
“DISF” tags with the symbols themselves. We
also mapped nine of the most frequent unigrams
to their own POS classes, such as “no”, “not”,
and “neither” to “NO” and “word” to “WORD”.
We then used counts of POS bigrams as a syn-
tactic feature. Additionally, as we observed that
responses to inappropriate requests contained a
higher proportion of function words, we added this
as a numeric feature. We also observed that aver-
age length of responses to inappropriate requests
was greater than responses to appropriate ones,
and we hypothesized this was in part due to in-
appropriate requests to spell long phrases. There-
fore, we also used the length of the total spelling
sequences, or the count of letters spelled out, as a
numeric feature. We also added type of clarifica-
tion request as a feature since some requests are
less likely to be inappropriate than others. For ex-
ample, we consider confirmation questions (“Did
you say . . . ?”) to always be appropriate.
5 Results
We report classification results using Weka’s J48
decision tree classifier with 10-fold cross valida-
tion in Table 2, which outperformed JRip and
LibSVM in our experiments. Compared to the
majority baseline of 63.2% accuracy and .489 F-
measure, our classifier which uses all of the fea-
tures in Table 1 achieves a significant improve-
ment, with an accuracy of 88.5% and an F-
measure of .885. A baseline method that uses
only system request type feature (Req. type base-
line) achieves accuracy of 73.7% and F-measure
of .686, which is significantly below the perfor-
mance of the trained classifier. To identify the
most important features in predicting inappropri-
ate requests, we iteratively removed a single fea-
ture from the full feature set and re-evaluated pre-
diction accuracy. Table 2 shows absolute decrease
Features Acc (%) P/R/F-Measure
Majority baseline 63.2 * 0.399/0.632/0.489
Req. type baseline 73.7 * 0.814/0.737/0.686
All Features 88.5 0.885/0.885/0.885
less request type −7.6 * −0.076
less liwc −2.3 −0.023
less pos bigrams −2.0 −0.020
less word unigrams −0.4 −0.004
less func ratio −0.1 −0.001
less len spell −0.05 −0.0005
less word bigrams +0.05 +0.0007
Table 2: Classifying Inappropriate Requests: All
Features vs. Baseline vs. Leave-One-Out Classi-
fiers, where * indicates statistically significant dif-
ference from All Features (p < 0.01)
in percentage points and in F-measure when each
feature is removed in turn compared to the clas-
sifier trained on the full features set. We found
that system request type was the most important
feature, as performance decreased by 7.6 percent-
age points without it. This makes sense in light of
the fact that the ratio of inappropriate to appropri-
ate requests varied for the different request types
represented in our dataset. The next most useful
features were the output of LIWC and the POS
bigrams. We had hypothesized that, since LIWC
captures the presence of negations and assents, it
could capture negative user responses to the sys-
tem such as yes or no. As for the POS bigrams, we
modified the POS tags to mark common words and
included start and end markers in the bigrams be-
cause we hypothesized that the first words and last
words in the responses might be particularly infor-
mative. Looking at the decision tree created with
all our features, we find that the first five branches
involve decisions regarding the unigrams “name”
and “SPELL” (a collapsed spelling sequence), the
〈START, “neither”〉 bigram, the LIWC ingestion-
word feature, and the type of request, in that order.
Not only do these findings confirm our hypothe-
ses, they also confirm that the unigrams “name”,
“SPELL”, and “neither” which we had mapped to
special POS classes are particularly useful.
After training our model, we used it to classify
our entire dataset to see which responses it per-
formed well on and which it tended to misclassify.
Responses to targeted reprise and targeted-reprise-
rephrase questions together accounted for around
half of the misclassified instances. Many easily
identifiable responses to inappropriate requests in-
volved the user correcting the system, as in the fol-
lowing example:
User: You are going to need to dole out
punishment.
System: I think this is a name: ‘dole out
punishment’. Please spell that name.
User: It is not a name, it is a phrase, dole
out punishment.
However, when the users did not correct the sys-
tem after an inappropriate request, their responses
appeared no different from answers to appropri-
ate requests. In the following example, the system
misrecognizes “hyperbaric” and interprets it as the
word “hyper” followed by an unknown phrase, but
the user simply ignores the request and repeats.
User: We are going to put you in a
hyperbaric chamber.
System: Put you in a high what? Please
give me another word or phrase
for ‘perbaric’.
User: Hyperbaric chamber.
Many cases in which appropriate requests were
misclassified as inappropriate involved users re-
sponding correctly to targeted or targeted-rephrase
questions. We hypothesize that these are also due
primarily to users ignoring the inappropriate sys-
tem request and providing the information the sys-
tem should have asked for. As a result, those cases
make it difficult to distinguish between responses
to appropriate and inappropriate targeted ques-
tions. Of course, users may be giving prosodic
cues to indicate confusion or uncertainty or hyper-
articulating in their responses. We will address the
use of prosodic features in predicting inappropri-
ate requests in future work.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we have addressed a novel task of
identifying inappropriate clarification requests us-
ing features extracted from user responses. We
collected responses to inappropriate clarification
requests based on six request types in a simulated
SDS environment. The classifier trained on this
dataset detects inappropriate requests with accu-
racy of 88.5%, which is 25.3 percentage points
above the majority baseline, and an F-measure of
.885, which is .396 points above the majority F-
measure. In future work, we will include acoustic
and prosodic features as well as lexical features
and we will evaluate the use of an inappropriate
clarification request component in our speech-to-
speech translation system.
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Appendix
ID Simulation Appro. Example
1. Confirmation
1 Correctly recognized utterance yes Did you say “place this on the pane”?
2 Misrecognized utterance yes Did you say “these are in um searches will cause the insur-
gents to priest buyer”?
2. Rephrase-part
1 Full non-name word or phrase yes Please say a different word for “surmise”.
2 Partial word no Please say a different word for “nouncing”.
3 Name no Please say a different word for “Afdhal”.
4 Extended segment including name no Please say a different word for “checkpoint at Betirma”.
5 Function word no Please say a different word for “off over”.
3. Disambiguate
1 One choice is correct yes Did you mean fliers as in handouts or fliers as in pilots?
2 Neither choice is correct no Did you mean plane as in aircraft or plain as in simple?
3 Word being disambiguated was not said no Did you mean sight as in vision or site as in location?
4. Spell
1 Name yes Please spell “Hadi Al Hemdani”.
2 Non-name no I think this is a name: “eluding”. Please spell that name.
3 Extended segment no Please spell “staff are stealing themselves”.
5. Reprise
1 Error segment correctly recognized and
no other errors
yes We will search some of the what?
2 Recognition error right before “what”
word
no Supplies of I see them what?
3 Recognition error which is not the last
word before “what”
no Ask if they are for eating for what?
6. Reprise rephrase
1 No errors outside of the error segment yes Use a what? Please say another word for “bristled”.
2 Error segment is a partial word no Are there any my what? Please say another word for “nors”.
3 Error outside the targeted segment no Be a right is what? Please say another word for “rain”.
Table 3: Clarification Requests and Contexts in which they are Appropriate and Inappropriate.
